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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 10 (1974), N U M B E R 3 
Semantic Evaluation of Prognostic 
Statements on the Base 
of Probabilistic Parameters 
LADISLAV TONDL 
The presented paper introduces some measures for the semantic evaluation of data used in pro-
gnostic procedures. The calculation of one of these measures, i.e. the calculation of the G-function 
is demonstrated by means of graphic form. 
1. THE CONCEPT "PROGNOSTIC STATEMENT" 
The interest in logical-semantic and semantic-information analysis of prognostic 
statements can be substantiated not only by the development of prognostics as such 
but also by the occurrence of prognostic statements in a number of empirical dis-
sciplines where it has proved inevitable to operate with statements on the future 
states of the systems under investigation. Neither is it possible to overlook the fact 
that the prediction of future states is one of the important cognitive aims of these 
disciplines. 
The concept "prognostic statement" which will be analysed in this paper calls for 
a certain explication. First of all, it should be stressed that the grammatical future 
alone is no guarantee that a prognostic statement is involved. By prognostic statement 
we understand a statement made for the purpose of determining the future state 
of the system under investigation, future events within the given "univers de discours", 
etc. 
From the point of view of form, three distinct types of prognostic statement may be 
distinguished: 
I. simple prognostic statements, e.g. "Tomorrow it will rain", "In 1978, probes 
will be launched to the most distant planets of our solar system", etc.; 
II. conditional prognostic statements, e.g. "If the air pressure today falls by ano-
ther 5 mm, it will rain tomorrow", "If we get new co-workers next year, we shall be 
able to fulfil the given task", etc.; 
III. justified prognostic statements, e.g. "Tomorrow it will rain because the air 
pressure today has fallen by 5 mm", "In the coming years, the demand for new 
furniture will double with regard to the present state because, in comparison with the 
present time, twice as many new flats will be completed". 
It is, naturally, quite possible to imagine a combination of conditional and justi-
fied prognostic statements, e.g.: "If event A happens in time t, event B will occur after 
the time interval At, because so far the occurrence of an event of the type A has 
always been followed by an event of the type 5 . " 
Prognostic statements can further be classified also according to the degree of cer-
tainty with which a possible fact mentioned in a prognostic statement is expected. 
Intuitively it is quite obvious that the degree of certainty greatly varies in the fol-
lowing statements: 
"At the end of this century, human civilization will be destroyed." 
"Next month it will be foggy." 
"On May 25, 1975, phenomena of this or that kind will be visible in the clear 
sky of the Northern hemisphere" 
The degree of certainty with which we expect a possible fact referred to in the 
prognostic statement is, in current language, usually expressed in a qualitative manner, 
e.g. by the words "certainly", "likely", "very probably", etc. Neither is it impossible 
to determine the degree of certainty by using comparative expressions facilitating 
the ordering of possible facts according to the degree of certainty with which they 
may be expected. 
The most advantageous form of determining the degree of certainty is, of course, 
quantitative determination, even though it is possible only in some cases; it is con-
nected with a number of problems and difficulties, If the degree of certainty with 
which a possible fact may be expected can be determined quantitatively, the dif-
ference among the above-mentioned types of prognostic statements can be expressed 
with the help of the following schematic examples: 
(I) With likelihood r (0 ^ r ^ l) we expect that in the time t, following after 
asserting this statement after the interval At, the system S will be in the state S,. 
(II) With the likelihood r (0 <J r 3* 1) w e expect that, if in the time t following 
after asserting this statement after the interval At, an object occurs having the pro-
perty A (or if we create objects with the property A etc.), we shall be able to ascertain 
the property B in the same object. 
(III) With the likelihood r (0 f£ r ^ 1) we expect that in the time t following 
after asserting this statement after the interval At an object with the property B 
will occur, because... (The expression following after the word "because" should 
justify the given prognostic statement, including its degree of certainty. This means 
that it is adequate to suppose that a nomological statement is involved, expressing 
certain scientific laws, hypotheses, empirical generalizations, etc.) 
In literature we also find other attempts at a typology of prognostic statements. 
For instance, distinction is drawn between prognostic statements which can be 
rationally justified regardless of whether type I, II or III are concerned, and prognostic 
statements for which no rational justification is available. For denoting the latter, 
the term "prophecy" is sometimes used. Prophecies were e.g. the statements of the 
augurs and haruspices of Ancient Rome; many statements of contemporary publicists 
are close to prophecy, aiming rather at influencing present conditions and decisions 
than at a precise and reliable definition of future facts. The term "prophecy" is 
somethimes found in literature to describe prognostic statements concerning the 
systems beyond human influence. (Such an explication of the term "prophecy" 
can be found e.g. in K. Proper's work [12]). As distinct from this, prognostic state-
ments concerning the systems which man is capable of influencing by his activity 
are characterized as "technical forecasts". However, such a distinction is inadequate 
because even some highly reliable and precise forecasts, e.g. in astronomy, have 
to be denoted as "prophecies", which is contrary to intuitive comprehension. This, 
however, is not meant to deny the usefulness of distinguishing between the so-called 
technical forecasts and forecasts relating to systems in whose development we are 
unable to interfere. 
A further possibility is to differentiate prognostic statements according to the 
nature of the data they include. Naturally, we may refer to prognostic statements 
only in case they contain a purposeful definition of future facts, events, etc. The time 
in future can be determined with the help of data which are chronologically stable 
(e.g. "December 1, 1990) or pseudodata (e.g. "tomorrow", "by the end of next 
month", etc.) which are chronologically unstable.* 
In the case of pseudodata, the chronological determination of the future fact is 
relativized with regard to the time when the prognostic statement is made. This 
means that the decisions of prognostic statements depend on whether also the time 
to which the relativization corresponds is known. 
On the basis of the characteristics of the prognostic statements described so far 
it may be concluded that, in analysing prognostic statements, at least their following 
components must be respected: (a) the chronological determination of the future 
fact, (b) the degree of certainty with which we expect the future fact to occur, (c) the 
chronological determination of the time of asserting the prognostic statement. While 
in any prognostic statement the first component is always stated explicitly, be it in the 
form of data or pseudodata, the second and the third components need not always be 
explicitly stated. 
With regard to the said components of prognostic statements, their logical analysis 
may be said to fall into two spheres of contemporary logic — i.e. the sphere of chrono-
logical logic** and the sphere of modal logic, in particular the sphere of epistemic 
* On distinguishing data and pseudodata, see [15, p. 201]. 
** The term "chronological logic" is not yet firmly established. In Anglo-Saxon literature, 
we find the terms "tense logic" (A. N. Prior), "temporal modalities" (N. Rescher), "chrono-
logical logic" (N. Rescher), "calculus of 'before' and 'after' " (G. E. Anscombe, D. R. Luce), 
a.o. In Russian logical literature we find the term "logika vremeni" (A. Ivin). 
modalities. For these reasons, prognostic statements may be considered as epistemo-
logical-chronological statement of of a special type. This basic characteristic of pro-
gnostic statements must be taken into account by any semantic analysis of these 
statements. 
2. SEMANTIC PROBLEMS OF PROGNOSTIC STATEMENTS 
The semantic decisions of prognostic statements depend on whether a chrono-
logically definite or a chronologically indefinite statement is involved.* Chrono-
logically definite statements are those chronological statements the semantic deci-
sions of which (denoted by Rescher as their truth) do not depend on the time when 
the chronological statement is asserted, for instance: 
"In 1348, the Prague university was founded." 
"In 1974, the first trains of Prague underground will run." 
"In 1990, the problem of food shortage in the world will be solved." 
Chronologically indefinite are those chronological statements the semantic decisions 
of which depend on whether the time of asserting the statement can be determined. 
In other words, in chronologically indefinite statements it is necessary to take into 
account the component (c). Chronologically indefinite statements are for instance: 
"Next year, a further 30 kilometres of the speedway between Prague and Brno 
will be completed." 
"Last month, the number of motor accidents increased by twenty per cent." 
"By the end of this year, the construction of the new hospital in our town will be 
finished." 
Though in chronologically indefinite statements it is usual to operate with pseudo-
data and in chronologically definite statements with data, these two distinctions are 
not fully identical. It is possible to imagine a chronologically definite statement 
operating with pseudodata, e.g.: 
"On October 3, 1973, the meteorologists stated that fog may be expected next 
week." 
The problems of semantic decisions of prognostic statements are a relatively com-
plex matter and cannot be reduced to decisions of current statements. Even if some 
authors refer to the truth of chronological statements, it is obvious that we can speak 
of truth stricto sensu only in the case of chronological statements relating to present 
or past facts. Since prognostic statements are supposed to relate to future facts, the 
choice of other characteristics than truth or falsity will be useful. These characteristics 
might be linked with the second component of prognostic statements, i.e. the degree 
of certainty with which we expect the future fact to occur. With a view to this second 
component, prognostic statements represent a specific kind of non-extensional con-
* On distinguishing between chronologically definite and chronologically indefinite state-
ments see [15, p. 200]. 
text; this is in connection with the modal character of the expressions used to de-
scribe the degree of certainty. Therefore it is usual, in connection with prognostic 
statements, to speak of likelihood, credibility, reliability, etc. 
The semantic analysis of prognostic statement cannot avoid the question of the 
extent to which the applicability of sense and denotation may be taken into account -
i.e. the applicability of such semantic categories as logical semantics has been operat-
ing with ever since the days of Frege and other pioneers in this field. More easily 
solvable is the question of the sense of prognostic statements. If we consider sense — 
as is done currently in logical semantics — to be a category of a conceptual nature, 
i.e. an invariant which remains unchanged in any correct translation, then it is easy 
to prove that sense may be assigned to any meaningful prognostic statement we are 
able to understand. (It is of no importance whether, in this connection, we refer 
to a "prognostic proposition" or to other analogous categories of a conceptual nature.) 
Though sense may be assigned to prognostic statements without great difficulty, 
this does not apply to the denotation of prognostic statements. Difficulties arise 
in particular if the problem of denotation of prognostic statements is conceived 
as the question of what "corresponds" to prognostic statements, what is "reflected" 
by them, what extra-linguistic objects are assignable to prognostic statements, etc. 
In other words, if entities are to be determined in some extra-linguistic universe 
which could be considered as donatations of prognostic statements, we find that the 
solution of this task is not at all unambiguous. 
First of all, it is necessary to verify to what extent the well-known procedure 
of Tarski can be applied in determining the denotation of prognostic statements; 
according to this procedure e.g. the statement "the sun shining" is true if and only 
if the sun is shining, i.e. the fact that the sun is shining is provable.* On the assumption 
that facts provable in the extra-liquistic universe can be assigned to true statements, 
we may ask what facts can be assigned to prognostic statements. Because "facts 
which have not yet occurred" even if we expect them to occur cannot be considered 
as identical with facts which we consider to be legitimately assignable to current 
(indicative) statements, the above-mentioned procedure is evidently unsuitable. 
Moreover, because "facts which have not yet occurred" are actually "non-facts", 
a situation arises which is utterly contradictory to the mentioned procedure. Nor 
will these difficulties be overcome by considering the truth value as the denotation 
of the statements, which is in accordance with the line of development in logical 
semantics represented in particular by Frege, Carnap and Church. As was already 
pointed out, it is possible to consider the truth or falsity of some chronological 
statements but it is hardly possible to consider the truth or falsity of prognostic 
statements. 
* This additional note to the well-known procedure of A. Tarski corresponds to the procedures 
used by A. A. Zinovjev [17]. In case this note is omitted it is necessary explicitly to determine 
the difference between object-language and metalanguage, or between two different modes of using 
a given text, e.g. by distinguishing the mode de dictu and de re, etc. 
If — despite of the mentioned defficulties - it is desirable to consider the denota-
tion of prognostic statements, the following solutions are possible: 
(1) Something that could be characterized as the "states of mind" of the persons 
asserting prognostic statements may be assigned to these statements. Such a solution 
seems plausible especially if we require "something" in the actual world to corres-
pond to the prognostic statements, i.e. hie et nunc. Though we may admit that what 
could be characterized as "states of mind" or something similar of the kind is of the 
nature of extra-linguistic entities presumable in the actual world, it is difficult to prove 
the presence of entities otherwise than by some — usually linguistic — behaviour. 
This also shows the absolute unreliability of such subjectivistic approach to the 
reconstruction of denotations of prognostic statements. 
(2) That which could be characterized in the spirit of the Leibnizian tradition 
in semantics as "states of the possible world", might be assigned to prognostic 
statements. This form of semantic analysis was elaborated especially for modal logic. 
As J. Hintikka [8, p. 81] pointed out, "possible worlds" or " states of possible 
worlds" can be interpreted as states in various moments of time. This facilitates 
the interpretation of chronological logics as special cases of modal logics, which is 
current in a number of systems of chronological logics. In this connection Hintikka, 
who worked out a remarkable system of semantics for modal logics based on the 
mentioned traditions, pointed out the particular role of the relation of alternative-
ness. Just as in modal logics various states of "possible worlds" are certain alter-
natives of the actual world or of a differently conceived original world, also in 
chronological statements a relation having an analogical role should be taken into 
account. (J. Hintikka recommends the term "futurity relation".) It is obvious that 
the minimum demand made on this relation is the demand of transitivity. 
This briefly outlined approach to the semantics of chronological statements is 
suitable wherever a system of simple chronological statements, conceived as a frag-
ment or a special case of modal logic, is involved. However, because in empirical 
and experimental sciences, including prognostics, primary attention is paid to justified 
prognostic statements, the demand should be raised that whatever corresponds 
to Hintikka's "futurity relation" should have some further qualities. For this reason, 
a third solution — which of course might be considered as a certain modification 
of the second solution — is presented. 
(3) "States of the possible world" that can be decided upon on the bais of available 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge available "hie et nunc", may be considered as denotations 
of prognostic statements. The term "deciding on the basis of available knowledge" 
can, of course, be interpreted in various ways. For instance, if available knowledge 
includes certain nomological statements, i.e. statements of scientific laws, hypotheses 
or empirical generalizations and statements of the respective empirical data on the 
basis of which prognostic statements can be deduced in the sense of Hempel's deduc-
tive-nomological model of explanation and prediction, then the term "deciding 
on states" may be interpreted as "deducing statements on states". However, since 
the deductive-nomological model of explanation and prediction is merely one ab-
stract model from among a whole range of possible procedures, which may also 
include probabilistic dependencies and statistical laws, it is better to keep to the more 
general term "deciding". 
This conception of the denotation of prognostic statements is particularly suitable 
for situations involving rationally justified prognostic statements that are based 
on the knowledge of the respective scientific laws and empirical data concerning 
initial conditions. A prognostic statement conceived in this way could then be 
schematically expressed as follows: S;, since S, and Se, where S( is the prognostic 
statement, S, is the nomological statement or the class of nomological statements 
(i.e. theory), and Se is the statement of the respective empirical data concerning 
initial conditions. 
Wherever the deductive nomological model of explanation and prediction is ap-
plicable, the mentioned scheme of the justified prognostic statement corresponds 
to the scheme of prediction, i.e. 
Sr. Se -> S; . 
S; denotes the possible state to be decided upon on the basis of S, and Se. In other 
words, the denotation of S; is relativized to the possibilities admitted by S, and Se. 
Further, it is necessary to consider the extent to which an extra-linguistic entity 
corresponding to the truth value of current indicative statements cannot be assigned 
to rationally justified prognostic statements. Since — as has been mentioned above 
— the denotation of a prognostic statement is relativized to the possibilities admitted 
by the nomological statements and the statements of the respective empirical data, 
the semantic category corresponding to the truth value must be relativized with 
regard to what is presented by the justification (explicit or implicit) of the prognostic 
statement. For this reason, the concept "nomological-empirical support" will be 
introduced and an attempt made at indicating the quantitative measures of this 
concept. At the same time, we shall bear in mind that a semantic category is involved 
which, in the case of justified prognostic statements, can assume a position analogical 
to that of the truth value of indicative statements related to the actual world. 
3. SOME COMMENTS ON CHRONOLOGICAL LOGICS 
As has already been mentioned above, the problems of prognostic statements 
and particularly the semantic analysis of prognostic statements are linked with the 
wide sphere of chronological logics even if, of course, these two areas do not fully 
coincide. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that prognostic statements are connected 
also with other section of contemporaty logic. Thus, for instance, it is known that the 
need of the semantic characteristics of prognostic statements was one of the stimuli 
for criticizing two-value logics and Lukasiewicz's attempt at construing a three-value 
logic. 
In contemporary chronological logics, particular attention is paid, on the one hand, 
to the concepts "before", "later", "at present" or to some modifications there of, 
and, on the other hand, to such concepts as "will be", "always will be", "has been", 
"always has been", etc. As for the first group of concepts which are usually con-
ceived as predicates in languages representing the applications of modern logic 
on physical, biological or psychological systems, the systems worked out by R. Carnap 
for physics [2], [4] and by J. J. Wodger for biology must not be overlooked. Carnap 
e.g. elaborated axioms and theorems of the so-called K — Z system where in K 
is the predicate of time coincidence and Z the predicate of time anteriority or poste-
riority. The pair or predicates (K, Z> represents a special case of a pair which, in the 
given universe, forms a quasi-series, facilitating thereby a time ordering of all the 
objects of the given universe. 
Somewhat different are the systems concerning the second group of concepts, i.e. 
"has been", "always has been", "will be", "always will be", etc. As a rule, such systems 
are constructed so that these concepts are conceived as modal operators. The best-
known systems of this kind are those of A. N. Prior [13], [14]; they are based on the 
modal systems of Lewis and Lukasiewicz, as well as on the ideas of Diodor of Krone 
concerning the concepts of "possibility" and "necessity". These axiomatically con-
structed systems actually define with more precision the meaning of the so-called 
weak and strong future ("always will be") and weak and strong past, and, on this 
basis, the meaning of further modal concepts. 
A further way of constructing chronological logics has been indicated by N. Re-
seller [15]. Rescher starts from the concept of "chronological realization" which he 
regards as an operator with the statements. If p is a chronologically indifinite state-
ment, then the operator for chronological realization R forms a new statement on the 
chronological realization of that to which p relates. "R,(p)" then means that "p is 
realized in time t". The properties of the concept "chronological realization" are 
then presented by means of axioms in the language whose vocabulary forms the 
statements (variables) p, q, r, ..., the variables for data t,f, ..., etc., usual connec-
tives, usual quantifiers over data variables, and finally the operator for chronological 
realization R. The properties of the concept "chronological realization" are then 
given by the following axioms: 
(Al) Rt(~p) = ~Rt(p), 
(A2) Rt(p.q)^lRt(p)].[Rt(q)-], 
(A3) " (V.) K,(p) - p , 
(A4) R,,[(V0R/p)]=(V0R((p), 
(A5) RtWp)] = Rt(p) • 
A different system of chronological logic os formed if (A5) is replaced by another 
axiom (A5*): 
(A5*) Rt{Rt(p)]=R, + t(p). 
Both these systems of chronological logic represent variants of the systems offered 
by Prior's chronological approach to modal logic. As shown by Rescher, also the 
systems based on the concept of chronological realization may introduce the modal 
concepts of "possibility" (M) and "necessity" (N) which may then be defined as 
follows: 
M(p) = (3r) Rt(p), 
N(p) =(Vt)Rt(t) . 
These or analogical approaches to chronological logic representing an interesting 
fragment of non-classical logic can specify the semantic properties of some terms 
occurring in prognostic statements, e.g. of the terms "will be", "will be realized 
in time t, that . . ." , etc. However, it is obvious that such approaches cannot present 
a semantic appreciation of prognostic statements as a whole. For this reason, a dif-
ferent starting-point should be chosen for construing the criteria of evaluating prog-
nostic statements. 
4. EVALUATION OF PROGNOSTIC STATEMENTS 
The evaluation of prognostic statement may start with the question "Why will S; 
be?"* The reply will the be: Because S,, and Se, where Sh is a nomological state-
ment or a class of nomological statements and Se is a statement of empirical data 
concerning initial conditions. However, as has been pointed out by W. Stegmuller 
[16, p. 171], the why-question relating to future events may be conceived as having 
two forms: in the first case, we simply ask "Why will S; be?"; in the second case we ex-
plicitly concentrate on the epistemical component of the prognostic statement, 
e.g. "Why do you think that S; will be?", etc. As a matter of fact, in both cases 
a justification of the prognostic statement is required; in the first case, however, ab-
straction is made from the epistemical vomponent "you consider", "you believe", 
"you are convinced", etc., whereas, in the second case, this component is explicitly 
stated. The distinction between the two mentioned forms of why-questions relating 
to prognostic statements, however, is merely a distinction of abstract types. Concrete 
procedures leading to rationally justified prognostic statements — such as are found 
in prognostics** — operate either by directly stating scientific laws, hypotheses, empiri-
* This is an epistemic why-question as distinct from explanation-seeking why-questions where 
St has the character of a true assertion. 
** A survey of these prognostic methods and procedures is given e.g. by E. Jantsch [9]. 
cal generalizations and trends or by the judgements of competent experts, by the 
coincidence of these judgements, etc., without explicitly stating the actual basis 
for prediction. Thus, for instance, prognostic statements are solicited with the help 
of the so-called Delphi method or other analogical methods.* 
Since however, it may be presumed that competent experts on whose judgement 
the prognostic statement is based are themselves capable of presenting a rational 
justification, we shall take for granted in our further considerations that prognostic 
statements can be evaluated on the basis of an explicit justification. In other words, 
the semantic evaluation of the prognostic statement S;, relating to a possible future 
fact, is possible in view of Sh and Se which are available hie et nunc. This also means 
that this semantic evaluation in always relativized to those epistemical means we can 
operate with at present. This moreover implies that such a semantic evaluation — 
relativized with regard to the present — can be modified if, in future, any change 
occurs in that which may be considered as the prediction basis for S;.** 
The semantic evaluation of this prediction basis involves, first of all, an evaluation 
of the nomological statement Sh with regard to prognostic statements or explananda. 
The concept "systematic, i.e. explanatory or predictive power" was introduced already 
by G. G. Hempel [6, p. 278] to denote such an evaluation of the nomological state-
ment Sh with regard to statements characterized in this way; this author presented 
one of the first quantification variants of this concept. 
The general conception of the concept "systematic power", based on Hintikka's 
concept "transmitted information" [7], was presented by Finnish logicians, ex-
pecially by J. Pietarinen and R. Tuomela [10], [11]. The intutitive starting-point 
is the following consideration: The fundamental informative task of nomological 
statements which form the basis of systematization procedure (i.e. scientific explana-
tion, classification, prediction procedures, diagnosis, etc.) is to reduce our uncertainty 
or ignorance as regard certain fact or possible states. Hence, scientific systematization 
provides information the value of which lies in its capability of changing the initial 
entropic level or the initial uncertainty. If we are able to evaluate any change in the 
initial uncertainty quantitatively, then we can also evaluate the systematic power 
of the nomological statement that can lead to such a change. In other words, the 
systematic power of the nomological statement Sh, with regard to that to which the 
statement S ; (this could be e.g. a prognostic statement) relates, is the greater, the 
more it reduces the initial uncertainty associated with S ;, If we denote the measure 
of the initial uncertainty or ignorance associated with S ; as U(S;) and the uncertainty 
* Thus the practice of contemporaty prognostics does not confirm Hempel's thesis that every 
adequate prediction is a potential explanation, and vice vera. This means that it is possible to for-
mulate prognostic statements concerning future events without being able to explain these or other 
substantial events. 
** The concept "prediction basis" corresponds to Hempel's concept "potential explanans" 
[6]. The evaluation of some of the difficulties we face in attempting to define this concept with more 
precision would exceed the scope of this study. For details, see [16, p. 708], 
associated with S ; — provided that the nomological statement Sh is also given — 
as U(SjjSh), then it is obvious that the measure of systematic power can be character-
ized by means of a function whose arguments are the initial uncertainty U(S;) and 
the uncertainty U(SijSh) which may be characterized as conditional uncertainty. 
(It is clear, or course, that also U(S;) may be conceived as conditional uncertainty 
on the assumption that S;, is a tautological statement, i.e. that U(S;) = U(StjSt), 
where S, is a tautology). Usually we take into consideration not only the nomological 
statement or a class of nomological statements S;, but also a class of empirical state-
ments Se concerning relevant initial conditions with respect to S;. Then the concept 
of systematic power takes into account not only the role of S,, with respect to S;, 
but the role of S;,. Se with respect to S,-. 
When proceeding from the intuitive starting-point thus conceived it is possible 
to formulate requirements which must be met by any satisfactory quantitative 
measure of the systematic power of the nomological statement with regard to that 
to which the statement S; relates. (It should be noted that no absolute measure 
of the systematic power S;, is referred to here, but a measure relativized to that to 
which S; relates.) If we denote this measure as E(ShjSt), it should meet the following 
requirements, as shown by J. Pietarinen [11]: 
(Rl) E(ShISt) = f[U(St) , U(S,/S;,)]. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to require t h a t / be a linear function of both the arguments. 
As will be seen later, the requirement (R5) will make it possible to conceive/as a func-
tion which values are monotonously decreasing if the values of its second argument 
are increasing. 
(R2) E(S;,/S,.)iO iff U(S,./S„) g 0 . 
It is further desirable that the systematic power of S„ with regard to S; be maximum, 
wherever the conditional uncertainty U(S,/S,,) is a minimum uncertainty. This is 
in accordance with 
(R3) £(S;,/S;) = m a x £ iff *7(S,/Sfc) = min V. 
It is reasonable to require that the minimum uncertainty be equal to zero, so that 
min U = 0 might be added to (R3) 
(R4) max E = 1 , 
(R5) E(ShjSt) = £(Sfc/S;) iff U(S,ISh) = U(S;/Sfc). 
On the basis of these requirements it is possible to define the measure of the systematic 
power of the nomological statement S;, with regard to that to which S ; relates in the 
following way: 
<D0 W - , ^ ^ . 
Obviously, the measure of the systematic power characterized in this way assigns 
an equal systematic power to all the nomological statement reducing the initial 
uncertainty of that to which S; relates — i.e. U(S;) — to the same level. 
It is also desirable that this measure of the systematic power should be additive. 
This measure is additive for two nomological statement, Sh and Sk, as follows: 
s(S„. Sk/S;) = 2T(S„/S;) + E(Sk/S;) 
iff 
U(S;/S„) + U(S,./Sk) - U(S;/Sft. sk) = u(s,). 
The definition (Dl) may be modified as follows: If we hold not only the nomological 
statement S,„ but also the empirical statement concerning certain initial conditions Se 
to be the prediction basis for S,-„ which is in agreement with Hempel's classical 
model which, in a deductive nomological instance, takes the form 
s„.se-tsi, 
then, if Se is known, the systematic power Sft may be relativized to S;. 
The modified measure of the systematic power can be defined as follows: 
fD2) F(S S l ^ - U(SiISe)-U(SiISh.Se) (D2) E(Sft. Se/S;) _ d r . 
Consequently, this modification presupposes three statements or classes of statements 
from which the ordered pair <Sft, Se> forms the prediction basis and S; is the prognos-
tic statement. 
If, for the sake of simplicity, we take into account only a pair of statement S,, and 
S;, we find that, on the basis of (Dl) and the mentioned requirements (Rl) —(R5), 
no limitations are given for the minimum value E(ShjS,), while max E, according 
to (R4), is always equal to 1. It is therefore necessary to formulate another require-
ment for min E. Here, two further possibilities are offered so that the requirement 
(R6) will appear in two alternatives: 
(R61) E(ShjS) = min E iff U(S;/Sft) = max U. 
The second alternative for min Eis the following: 
(R6u) -{-*/- ,) = min E iff U(S;/SA) = U(S;). 
This second alternative corresponds to the presumption that the nomological state-
ment Sft is irrelevant with regard to what S; relates to. 
The fact that there are two alternatives for min E indicates that the term "un-
certainty" hitherto employed is ambiguous and must be further specified. It is evident 
that the conditional uncertanty U(S;/Sft) is minimum, i.e. equal to zero, provided 
that Sft logically implies S;. Then also 2i(Sft/S;) = max E = 1. Thus it holds good 
that - provided that Sft -^ S; - E(ShIS,) = 1 and U(S;/Sft) = 0. 
The conditions for min E and thereby also the conditions for max U are more 
difficult to determine. Here it is necessary to take account both the above mentioned 
alternatives designated as I and II. 
According to the first alternative 2;(Sft/S;) is minimum, if Sft L-implies the negation 
of S;. Since Sft logically implies ~ S;, the certainty with which we expect S, to occur is 
minimum and the corresponding conditional uncertainty U(S,/Sft) is maximum, i.e. 
(I) if Sh -j> ~ S ; , then E(Sft/S;) = min E. 
The second alternative does not operate with the negation of S; but with the nega-
tion of Sft. The measure of the systematic power of Sh with respect to S; is minimum 
if S; logically follows from the negation of Sft, i.e. 
(II) if ~ S f t - ^ S ; , then E(S„/S;) = min E. 
Both the alternatives, i.e. alternative (I) and (II), suppose different conceptions 
of the uncertainty of a statement. Alternative (I) which considers E(ShjS) as minimum 
where the conditional uncertainty U(S,/Sft) is maximum and, provided that the nega-
tion of S; logically follows from Sft, interprets the measure of uncertainty of the prog-
nostic statement S; as the measure of unexpectedness of that to which S; relates. 
The alternative (II) which considers E(ShjS^) to be minimum where the conditional 
uncertainty S; — ifS,, is given — is equal to the initial uncertainty S;, and, provided 
that S; logically follows from the negation of Sft, interprets the measure of uncer-
tainty of the prognostic statement S; as the measure of the lack of knowledge of that 
to which S; relates. 
The measure of-uncertainty, therefore, must satisfy the following requirements: 
(Ul) U(S;/Sft) ^ 0 , 
(U2) if Sft -^ S,, then U(S,/Sft) = 0 , 
(U3) if Sft is a tautological statement, then U(S,jSh) = U(S;) . 
The intuitive sense of these postulates is quite evident. The fourth postulate is present-
ed in two alternatives, according to whether the measure of uncertainty of the pro-
gnostic statement is conceived as the measure of unexpectedness (I) or as the measure 
of the lack of knowledge (II): 
(U4)1 if Sft-^~S;, then U(S,/Sft) is minimum. 
(U4n) if ~S f t -j> Sit then U(S;/Sft) = U(S;). 
The concrete form of the quantification of the measure of uncertainty, whether 
interpreted according to (I) or according to (II), depends on circumstances of a pro-
gamatical nature. It is also possible to use traditional measure of semantic information 
i.e. either the information measure (inf) or the content measure (cont), the properties 
of which are described in the classical work by Carnap and Bar-Hillel [1]. Since 
the information or content measure of a given statement can also be characterized 
with the help of adequate probability measures (e.g. Carnap's m-function), both the 
conceptions of uncertainty can be expressed not only by means of information 
or content measure but also by means of the corresponding probability measure. 
If p(i) is such a probability measure connected with statement S;, p(ijh) the conditional 
probability measure of S; with respect to Sh, then the information or content measures 
can be characterized as follows: 
inf(S ;) = - l o g p ( 0 , 
cont (S;) = 1 - p(i), 
inf(S ;/S,) = -log p(ijh), 
cont (S;/S„) = 1 - p(ijh) . 
Hence, on the basis of alternative (l), the measure of uncertainty C/(S,/Sft) may be 
quantified either as 
(1) inf(S ; /S , ) , i.e. -log p(ijh) 
or as 
(2) cont (SJS,,), i.e. 1 - p(ijh) . 
On the basis of alternative (II) we obtain either 
(3) P(h v 0 - P(i) = P(h) - P(h . i) = P(h) [ l - P(;/h)] 
or 
tA\ 1 P(h V 0 
(4) log a — 1 . 
KO 
Some hesitations could be conected with the assignment of probability measure 
to statements of various kind, i.e. to nomological statements, prognostic statements 
and empirical statements concerning relevant initial conditions. It is therefore neces-
sary to introduce the following convention: In spite of differences,in construction 
or justification of the probability measure (which can be conceived as confirmation 
measure of nomological statements by all the evidence available so far) we shall sup-
pose that this measure fulfil in all instances the axioms of probabilitity theory. 
The four mentioned alternative measures of uncertainty* evidently do not exhaust 
all the possibilities: if other (usually pragmatical) means for determining the quality 
* For a more detailed analysis of these four measures see [11]. 
of the result are available, we may construe other measures of uncertainty or shifts 
in the initial uncertainty corresponding to the intuitive principle: The shift in un-
certainty is the greater, the higher is the quality of the result we are able to attain, 
or the more we can reduce the (average) risk connected with the final result. 
By substituting, in (Dl), one of the alternative (1) — (4) for the measures of un-
certainty appearing in the definition of the systematic power of the nomological 
statement Sh with regard to that to which S, relates, four different measures of syste-
matic power are obtained. The choice of one of the alternatives depends on circum-
stances of a pragmatical nature. If, for instance, the value of the systematic power 
were to move between 0 and 1 and, moreover, if the values of all the applied mea-
sures of uncertainty were to have the same limits, then the alternative (3) should be 
chosen. Thus we obtain the quantitative determination of E(ShjS) suggested already 
by Hempel and Oppenheim [5] which can be expressed as follows: 
(D3) wsi -„ 1 ^ 3 - i - m B - ffffl • K~>/~» . 
1 - p(l) 1 - p(i) 
This measure is additive for any two nomological statements which are logically 
disjunct, i.e. if Sh v Sk is logically true, then 
E(Sh. SkjS) = E(ShjSt) + £(8,18,) . 
In connection with this condition for the additivity of the measure of the systematic 
power, certain consequences should be noted that are of importance for establishing 
the optimum prediction basis: from the above condition it is evident that for n nomo-
logical statements which are mutually exclusively disjunct it holds that 
E(Shi . S,2 ... SJS) = E(ShJSi) + E(SjSl) + ... + E(SjS,) . 
If Stheor is a conjunction of nomological statements characterized in this way, it is 
expedient to look for all the components of this conjuctive class of nomological 
statements that are capable of increasing the systematic power with respect to that 
to which S, relates. At the same time, it is possible to formulate the following rule 
for reduction: 
All the nomological statements which do not increase the systematic power of 
Stheor with respect to S, can be excluded from Stheor. In other words, we can exclude 
all the nomological statements of which it holds that E(ShJSt) = 0. This rule for 
reduction can also be formulated as follows: All the nomological statements for 
which it holds that E(ShJSt) = 0, may be characterized as systematically irrelevant 
nomological statements with respect to S{. Hence, the rule for reduction has the fol-
lowing form: 
All the nomological statements that are systematically irrelevant with respect 
to S, can be exleded from Stheor as the prediction basis for S ;. 
In establishing the optimum prediction basis for S ;, the requirement is worth 
formulating which is a kind of analogy to Carnap's requirement of total evidence 
for probabilistic and inductive logics: "In the application of inductive logic to a given 
knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as a basis for deter-
mining the degree of confirmation" [3, p. 211]. If, for determining the degree of con-
firmation of a given nomological statement, it is expedient to formulate the requiren-
ment of total evidence or some less strict variant of this requirement (e.g. the require-
ment of a maximum actually, i.e. hie et nunc available evidence), it is equally ex-
pedient to formulate the following requirement for establishing the optimum pre-
diction basis: 
[RI] In determining an adequate prediction basis with respect to Sh all knowledge 
that is not systematically irrelevant to S ; must be considered as its foundation. 
Following the above considerations concerning the prediction basis, some other 
concepts can be introduced, in particular that of "permissible reduction" for Stheor 
and that of "sufficient prediction basis". Supposing Stheor is a conjunctive class 
of nomological statements which are mutually logically disjunct, then the permis-
sible reduction for Stheor with respect to S ; is conceived as the omission of those 
elements of Stheor which are only negligibly systematically relevant to S;, i.e. in which 
E(ShJSt)£e, 
where e is a conventionally agreed value not very different form 0. 
Similarly we may introduce the concept of a "sufficient prediction basis" with 
respect to S ;: Stheor is a sufficient prediction basis with respect to Sh if .E(S(,,e(„./S;) ^ 
S: n, where n is a conventionally agreed value ensuring a sufficiently reliable level 
of predicting that to which S, relates. 
The requirement [RI] can be modified if we proceed from the modified measure 
of systematic power, i.e. from (D2). Hence, in establishing the prediction basis with 
respect to S ;, we must take into account not only Stheor which includes all the nomo-
logical statements that are systematically relevant with respect to Sh but also all the 
statements concerning the empirically determined initial conditions that are systemati-
cally relevant with respect to S ;. Then the term "all knowledge which is not systemati-
cally irrelevant with respect to S ; " includes not only Stheor but also the total evidence 
available. As a matter of fact, the requirement for determining the optimum prediction 
basis conceived in this way is an inductive logical analogy of Laplace's famous con-
ception of "inteligence absolue". 
So far, the semantic informational evaluation of justified prognostic statements 
can be related mainly to that which has been characterized here as the prediction 
basis with respect to the prognostic statement S(. However, another procedure may be 
chosen as the starting-point for evaluating S ; the intuitive starting-point of which is 
the following consideration: Since the role of Sh, or the role of Sh . Se as the pre-
diction basis with respect to S ; is to reduce the uncertainty of that to which S ; relates, 
we may ask to what measure S ; is supported by disposing of Sft or of Sh. Se. The 
measure to which S ; is supported by our having Sft or Sh. Se at our disposal can be 
characterized as a nomological support of S ;, or as a nomological — empirical support 
of S;. 
If At(S,/Sft) represents the nomological support of S ; on the basis of Sh, we may 
take into consideration the measure of the nomological support At(S,/S,,), or the 
measure of the nomological-empirical support NE(S(JSh. Se) which would fulfil the 
following requirements: 
(rl) if SifSj and Sh = Sk, then At(SjS„) = N(Spk) . 
(r2) if Shl>Si, then At(S;/Sft) = max At. 
This requirement can be complemented as follows: If it is desirable (in accordance 
with the manner of quantification hitherto employed) for the value At(S;/Sft) to range 
between 0 and 1, it may be added to (r2) that max At = 1. In agreement with this, 
the following requirement in chosen: 
(T3) if Sh^~Si, then At(SjS„) = minAt, 
(r4) 0 5g A(S;/Sft) ^ 1 . 
Analogical conditions may be formulated for ArE(S;/Sft. Se): these differ from 
(r 1) — (r4) only by the fact that wherever there is the nomological statement Sft, 
we find conjugation Sft. Se. It is therefore evident that these conditions are satisfied 
by a concept which is a complement of the concept cont (SijSh) or of the concept 
cont (SilSh. Se). On other words, the concept of "nomological support" or the con-
cept of "nomological-empirical support" might also be characterized as the condi-
tional certainty of S ; with regard to Sft, or to Sh. Se. This also means that the concept 
of "nomological support" or that of "nomological-empirical support" can show the 
credibility or likelihood of the prognostic statement S ; with regard to Sft or to Sft. Se 
the more adequately, the more fully the requirement (RI) is met. 
5. GAIN (OR LOSS) FUNCTION 
The determination of a prognostic statement proceeding from the available pre-
diction basis may also be considered as a decision-making process. If, in this process, 
decisions could be made with an absolute certainty as regards the reliability of all the 
data, no risk connected with this process would have to be considered. In reality, 
however, in a number of procedures at the determination of sufficiently reliable 
prognostic statements it is expedient to make allowance for a certain risk. For this 
reason, we may ecamine the applicability of some categories of the decision theory. 
We are primarily concerned with what we gain by having opted for the prognostic 
statement S; and not for its negation, i.e. ~ S ; . The expected gain will be the greater, 
the higher is the measure of the nomological support of S; on the basis of Sft or on the 
basis of Sft. Se, and the greater, the higher is the measure of the systematic power 
Sft or Sft. Se with regard to S;. At the same time we can say that the expected gain 
will be the smaller, the higher is the measure of the nomological support of ~S ; on the 
basis of Sft or Sft. Se, and the smaller, the higher is the systematic power of Sh or 
Sft . Se with respect to ~ S ; . 
If the concept of "expected gain" is considered as a quantitative concept, then 
we are bound to respect also the possibility of a neagative gain, i.e. of a loss. For this 
reason it is desirable that, in the quantification of this concept, we would be able 
to operate also with negative values. Therefore, the following definition of the mea-
sure of the expected gain (or of the expected loss, if negative values are involved) 
is at hand; let us denote is as G(S,/Sft) or G(S,jSk. Se): 
(D4) G(S;/Sft) = df /V(S;/S„) £(Sft/S;) - N(~ StjSh) E(Shj ~ S;) , 
or 
G(StISh . S.) = d f NE(SijSh. S.) Z7(S„/Se. S;) -
-7V£ (~S ; /S f t .S e )ZT (S f t .S e /~S ; ) . 
If this measure of the expected gain is required to attain values ranging from 
— 1 to + 1 , the complement of cont (S;/Sft) or the complement of cont (S,/Sft. S.) 
should be chosen for determining 7V(S,/Sft) or iV(S;/Sft. Se), i.e. the likelihood of the 
prognostic statement S ; with regard to the respective prediction basis. If likelihood 
is determined on the basis of the conditional probability p(i\h) or p(i\h . e), the fol-
lowing determination of the measure of the expected gain is obtained: 
G(S;/Sft) = p(ijh) p(~hj~i) - p(~ijh) p(~hji), or 
= p(ijh . e) p(~(h . e)l~i) - p(~i\h .e) p(~(h . e)ji). 
Let us now examine the following extreme cases. If it holds that 
sh • se r s;, 
i.e. in a reliably deductive-nomological case, we obtain 
NE(SiISh . S e ) = l , 
E(Sh.SejS,) = 1 , 
A r£'(~S ;/S f t.S ;) = 0 . 
Regardless of that, in this case, it holds that 
E(Sh.Sel~St) ^ 0 , 
we arrive at 217 
G(S,./S„. Se) = 1 . 
If we opt for S, and if it holds that S„. Se —» S;, the expected gain is max G, i.e. it is 
equal to 1. 
However, if we opt for ~ S ; and if it holds that S„. Se -j* S;, we obtain 
G(~S;/S„. S.) = NE(~StISh • Se) E(Sh. SC/~S;) -
- AtE(S;/S„. Se) E(Sh. Se/S;). 
Since the same values are obtained in the reverse order, our loss is a maximum 
loss, i.e. 
G(~S;/S„.Se) = m i n G = - 1 . 
If S„. Se —• S; does not hold, i.e. the deductive-nomological model cannot be 
used to determine the prognostic statement, e.g. if we operate only with statistical 
laws or, in other words, if that to which S; relates can be deduced only on the basis 
of probabilitical dependencies, G may attain values between — 1 and 1. 
The expected gain (or expected loss) can be considered as a function of three 
initial data: 
(1) the (a priori) probability measure assigned to the fact or event denoted by S;, 
i.e. p(i); 
(2) the measure of nomological-empirical support of S; provided S;, . Se are given, 
i.e. NE(SijSh. Se) or p(i\h . e); 
(3) a probabilistic measure assigned to S„ . Se. A probabilistic measure assigned 
to nomologiced statements can we corrider as the measure of confirmation by all the 
evidence anailable so ar. A probabilistic measure assigned to an empirical statement 
Se may be considered as probability measure assigned to the fact or event denoted 
by Sc. 
If we denote p(i) as A, p(h . e) as B and p(ijh . e) as C, following conditions for 
limits of the values of A, B and C can be proved: 
If A and B are given, then: 
(a) if B > A and A + B ^ 1, then 
~ > B > 0 , 
B 
(b) if B > A and A + B ^ 1, then 
±>c^A+B-" 
B ~~ B 
(c) if A ^ B and A + B g 1, then 
1 ^ C > 0 , 
Fig. 1. G-function for A = 0-1, B = 0-1, 0-2, . . . , 0-9. 
0.5Ì 
Fig. 2. G-function for C = 0-6, B = 0-1, 0-2, . . . , 0-9. 
(d) if A > B and A + B > 1, then 
1 > C > 
A + B - 1 
B 
" B and C are given, then 
1 + BC - B > A < BC . 
If A and C are given, it holds that 
(a) if A > C, then 
(b) if C > A, then 
Since 
1 - A 
1 - C 
A 
> ß ^ 0, 
^ ß P , 
G^S,,. Se) = /VE(S;/SҺ . Se) E(SҺ. SjS,) -
7 - M ľ ( ~ S ; / S А . S e ) £ ( S f t . S ( J ~ S ; ) 
Fig. 3. G-function for /i = 0 1 , C = 0-1 0-2, . . . , 0-9. 
220 and 
/VE(S;/SA . Se) = C , 
E(S,.Se/S;) = i - ^ r , i — A 
NE(~S;ISh.Se) = 1 - C, 
£ ( S „ . S e / ~ S ; ) = 1 - ^ , 
A 
the expected gain (or loss) equals 
w o /o ox C - AC - -BC + J3C2 A - AC - 5C + £C2 
G(S;/S, . S.) = — • 
It is also possible to demonstrate the G-function by means of graphic forms. We will 
show only a few examples of these graphic forms with indicated conditions. 
The author expresses his deep thanks to Mr. O. Hans who have helped with the calculations 
of the values of the G-function by the computer. 
(Received November 22, 1973.) 
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